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analyze the optimal monetary policy when countries cooperate in the face of a "global 
liquidity trap" -- i.e., a situation where the two countries are simultaneously caught in 
liquidity traps. The notable features of the optimal policy in the face of a global liquidity 
trap are history dependence and international dependence. The optimality of history 
dependent policy is confirmed as in local liquidity trap. A new feature of monetary policy 
in global liquidity trap is whether or not a country's nominal interest rate is hitting the zero 
bound affects the target inflation rate of the other country. The direction of the effect 
depends on whether goods produced in the two countries are Edgeworth complements or 
substitutes. We also compare several classes of simple interest-rate rules. Our finding is 
that targeting the price level yields higher welfare than targeting the inflation rate, and that 
it is desirable to let the policy rate of each country respond not only to its own price level 
and output gap, but also to those in the other country. 
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The world economy now faces the largest economic downturn since World War II. To pre-
vent further economic deterioration, most central banks in developed economies, including
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, have reduced policy interest rates to
unprecedentedly low levels, acting promptly and in unison. The liquidity trap is no longer
an extreme event only for one country, but has become an international concern that needs
to be solved through international monetary cooperation. Figure 1 shows nominal interest
rates from year 2008 to 2009 in several advanced countries. All nominal interest rates
exhibit drastic decreases from their levels in 2008.
In this paper we investigate how monetary authorities of di⁄erent countries should
coordinate with each other when they ￿nd themselves simultaneously caught into a liquidity
traps; that is, how they should coordinate policy measures in the case of a global liquidity
trap. For this purpose, we consider a two-country version of the model of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003), and study the optimal monetary policy coordination in an environment
where the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate binds in both countries.
We start by asking under what conditions countries in an open economy separately
might fall into a liquidity trap. We assume producer currency pricing and complete in-
ternational asset markets. Then, if the nominal interest rate never hits the zero bound,
the optimal policy is given by setting the in￿ ation rate of domestically produced goods
price index (DPI) to be zero for each country at all times, as in previous studies such as
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003). Under such a policy,
the nominal interest rate in each country is set equal to the real interest rate associated
with its own DPI. Thus we can de￿ne the ￿natural rate of interest￿for each country as the
DPI-based real interest rate in the equilibrium with zero DPI in￿ ation. The ￿rst best can
be attained as long as the natural rate of interest de￿ned in this way is positive for each
country. However, once a country￿ s natural rate becomes negative, its nominal interest rate
will hit the zero bound and its economy will fall into a liquidity trap. Thanks to complete
international asset markets, every household in every country has access to the same set
of assets at the same prices. Thus, households face the same real interest rate associated
with its own consumer price index (CPI) in the two countries. Nevertheless monetary au-
thorities in di⁄erent countries will face di⁄erent real interest rates, because DPIs will vary
if countries produce di⁄erent goods. This explains why it is possible for countries to fall
1separately into liquidity traps even though international asset markets are complete.1
We then show that the optimal monetary policy in the case of a global liquidity trap
exhibits two notable features: history dependence and international dependence. The im-
portance of the history dependence in the conduct of monetary policy during a liquidity
trap has been noted in previous studies on the closed economy.2 The adverse e⁄ect of
the liquidity trap can be mitigated if the monetary authority commits to generate some
in￿ ation and stimulate production in the future. Such a mechanism is also at work in a
global liquidity trap.3
The international dependence of the optimal monetary policy discussed in this paper is
a new feature of interdependence that arises in a global liquidity trap. In open economies,
countries are naturally interrelated through trades in goods and services. In the context
of optimal monetary policy, several aspects of such interdependence across countries have
been analyzed in previous studies such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) and Benigno
and Benigno (2003). One of our main ￿ndings is that a global liquidity trap brings about
a new form of interdependence in the optimal monetary policy in open economies. In our
model, if the nominal interest rate never hits the zero bound, the optimal policy could
be implemented by a purely inward-looking in￿ ation-targeting policy in which the target
in￿ ation rate for each country depends only on its own output gap.4 This is no longer
the case once the possibility that the zero bound binds is taken into account. The target
in￿ ation rate for each country necessarily depends on conditions in the other country.
We then examine if the optimal monetary policy can be approximated by a simple
interest-rate rule. For a closed economy where there is no possibility of a liquidity trap,
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) show that the optimal policy is replicated fairly well by
the class of interest-rate rules that respond only to the in￿ ation rate. Taking the liquidity
1In the model, a di⁄erence between DPI and CPI emerges from di⁄erent baskets between production
and consumption in each country thanks to trade. Thus, this di⁄erence does not come from a relation
between intermediate producers and retailers as in a real economy.
2Examples on previous work on the closed economy include, among others, Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007).
3Our companion paper of Fujiwara, Sudo, and Teranishi (2010) also investigates the international de-
pendence under a global liquidity trap using three-states model. It, however, assumes the considerably
restricted situations where one speci￿c country must ￿rst escape from a liquidity trap, and deterministic
shock.
4This has been shown previously, for instance, by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001).
2trap into consideration, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that a simple price-level
targeting policy performs well for the closed economy. Our question here is whether such
a similarly simple monetary policy rule can be identi￿ed in our model of a global liquidity
trap. What we ￿nd, in line with Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), is that an interest-
rate rule with a price-level target performs much better than the corresponding rule with
an in￿ ation target. Furthermore, improved performance is obtained when we allow the
interest-rate rule for each country to depend on the other country￿ s price level and output
gap. This is because such a rule helps to capture, at least to some extent, the international
dependence that a desirable policy should possess when faced with a global liquidity trap.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature on
liquidity traps. Section 3 describes our two-country NOEM model and derives the world-
loss function. In section 4, we analyze the optimal policy coordination problem, and show
that history and international dependences are crucial features of the optimal policy when
the zero bound may bind. We also present a numerical example, which allows further
investigation into the properties of the optimal policy. Section 5 considers simple interest-
rate rules, and examines how well they can approximate the optimal policy in the face of
a global liquidity trap. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Brief Survey of the Related Literature
The BOJ￿ s adoption of what was e⁄ectively a zero interest rate policy in the late 1990s
renewed interest in the liquidity trap. For the case of the closed economy, the properties
of the optimal (or at least desirable) monetary policy under such circumstances have been
investigated, for instance, by Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), Kato and Nishiyama (2005), Adam and Billi
(2006, 2007), and Nakov (2008).
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) examine how to conduct monetary policy when the
non-negativity condition for the nominal interest rate may bind using the FRBUS model.
In order to mitigate the de￿ ationary impact of a liquidity trap, they show that it is desirable
for the monetary authority to commit to maintain a zero interest rate for some periods
even after the adverse shock that triggered the liquidity trap has disappeared. They did
not derive the optimal monetary policy in their model, but later studies show that such
history dependence is indeed one of its important characteristics.
3Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) derive
the optimal monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian model. As suggested by Reif-
schneider and Williams (2000), they show that the optimal policy possesses the history-
dependence property that the nominal interest rate remains zero for a while even after the
adverse shock itself disappears. The commitment to such a policy ameliorates the de￿ a-
tionary pressure in earlier periods where the the adverse shock exists, because it raises the
expected in￿ ation rate and lowers the real interest rate. Their models have been extended
to di⁄erent stochastic environments by Kato and Nishiyama (2005), Adam and Billi (2006)
and Nakov (2008). The basic message that history dependence is the key feature of the
optimal monetary policy in the face of a liquidity trap is unchanged in these extensions.
Coenen and Wieland (2003), Svensson (2001), and Nakajima (2008) study a liquidity
trap in open economies. Coenen and Wieland (2003) and Svensson (2001) emphasize the
importance of raising the expected rate of in￿ ation in an open economy context, and explore
its implications for the nominal exchange rate. Nakajima (2008) analyzes the optimal
monetary policy in a two-country version of the model of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
These studies, however, restrict attention to a ￿local liquidity trap,￿where there is only
one country in the liquidity trap. The contribution of our paper is to extend the enquiry
to encompass a global liquidity trap, where two countries are simultaneously caught in
liquidity traps.
The optimal policies in the face of, respectively, global and local liquidity traps turn
out to be di⁄erent not only during periods when both countries are stuck in liquidity traps,
but also in other periods when one country has successfully escaped. This is because we
are considering the optimal policy commitment. Even in an environment where only one
country remains in a liquidity trap, the optimal policy committed to is di⁄erent depending
on whether the commitment was made in a period when both countries were caught in a
liquidity trap, or when one country had already escaped the liquidity trap. In this sense,
the optimal policy problem in the face of a global liquidity trap is a distinct problem, for
which we provide new insights from both analytical and computational viewpoints.
43 The Model
3.1 Households
The model economy is an open-economy version of the sticky-price model developed by
Woodford (2003), and closely related to the ones considered by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2001), and Benigno and Benigno (2003), among others.
The world economy consists of two countries; the home country (H), and the foreign
country (F). The size of population in country j 2 fH;Fg is nj, where nH + nF = 1. A
set of di⁄erentiated products are produced in each country and they are traded between
the two countries. Let Nj denote the set of those products. We assume that NH = [0;nH],
and NF = (nH;1].
In each country identical households reside, who consume di⁄erentiated commodities,
supply di⁄erentiated labor, and own ￿rms in their country. Monetary policy is set by the
monetary authority in each country. Details of monetary policy are discussed later.
3.1.1 Preferences


















where 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0, and ‘t(i), i 2 NH, is the supply of type-i labor, which is used to


















where CH;t and CF;t are the consumption indexes for, respectively, home and foreign goods














; j = H;F: (3)
Here, ￿ > 1 and ct(i) 2 Nj is the home household￿ s consumption of good i produced in
country j 2 fH;Fg. It is convenient to de￿ne the function u(CH;CF) by









5The lifetime utility of a representative household in the foreign country F takes the





















The consumption indexes for the foreign household, fC￿
t ;C￿
H;t;C￿
F;tg, are de￿ned as in


























; j = H;F:
Corresponding to the consumption indexes in the home country, Ct, Cj;t, j = H;F, the















; j = H;F;
where pt(i), i 2 Nj, j 2 fH;Fg, is the price of good i produced in country j quoted
in the home currency. The price indexes in the foreign country, P￿
t , P￿
j;t, j = H;F, are
de￿ned similarly by individual good prices, p￿
t(i), i 2 Nj, j 2 fH;Fg, quoted in the foreign
currency.
We assume that the law of one price holds:
pt(i) = Etp￿
t(i);
for all i 2 Nj, j 2 fH;Fg, where Et is the nominal exchange rate, de￿ned as the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency. It follows that Pj;t = EtP￿




We assume worldwide complete ￿nancial markets. The ￿ ow budget constraint for the home
household is






di + Tt; (5)
6where Et is the conditional expectation operator, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor
between dates t and t + 1 for nominal payo⁄s in the home country, Wt+1 is the portfolio
of one-period state-contingent bonds, wt(i) is the date-t nominal wage rate for type i 2
NH labor, ￿t(i) is the date-t nominal pro￿ts from sales of good i 2 NH, and Tt is the
nominal lump-sum transfer from the home government. Given the initial asset holding,
W0, the home household maximizes its lifetime utility as expressed in equation (1) subject
to equation (5).
The ￿ ow budget constraint for the foreign household is expressed analogously as:
EtP￿















t+1 is the portfolio of state-contingent bonds in the foreign currency, w￿
t(i) is the
nominal wage rate for type i 2 NF labor, ￿￿
t(i) is the nominal pro￿t from sales of good
i 2 NF, and T￿
t is the nominal lump-sum transfer from the foreign government. Given
the initial asset holding W￿
0, the utility maximization problem for the foreign household is
de￿ned as for the home household.
The ￿rst-order conditions that fCt;C￿
t ;‘t(i);‘￿
































; i 2 NF:
Here, ~ uc(Ct+1) denotes the partial derivative of ~ u(Ct+1) with respect to Ct+1. We use
corresponding notation for other derivatives. As we shall see, policy makers￿stabilization
e⁄orts turn out to be best targeted not at Pt and P￿
t , but at PH;t and P￿
F;t. Thus it is more
convenient to rewrite the ￿rst-order conditions in terms of Cj;t and C￿






























































73.1.3 Equilibrium shares of consumption
Under the standard assumption that the representative households of the two countries are
equally wealthy in the initial period, their equilibrium consumption levels are identical for
all t:
CH;t = C￿
H;t; CF;t = C￿
F;t; Ct = C￿
t :
Let yt(i), i 2 NH, and y￿
t(i), i 2 NF, denote the aggregate supply of home and foreign
goods, respectively:
yt(i) = nHct(i) + nFc￿
t(i); i 2 NH; y￿
t(i) = nHct(i) + nFc￿
t(i); i 2 NF:












































H;t = YH;t; CF;t = C￿
F;t = YF;t; Ct = C￿
t = Yt: (11)
3.2 Aggregate supply
3.2.1 Technology
For simplicity, we assume that the technology to produce each good is linear in labor:




t(i); i 2 NF;
where At and A￿
t represent country-speci￿c technology shocks.
For later use, it is convenient to de￿ne random variables ￿t and ￿￿
t by
￿t ￿ ￿(1 + !)lnAt; ￿￿
t ￿ ￿(1 + !)lnA￿
t;



























8Thus, v(y;￿) and v￿(y￿;￿￿) measure the disutility of producing y and y￿ in the home and































where we have used equilibrium conditions given by equations (11).
3.2.2 Natural rates of output
Each producer takes the wage rate as given.5 Using the equations (11) and the household￿ s









; j = H;F;
the nominal pro￿ts of a home supplier of good i 2 NH at date t are given by
￿

















where ￿ is the constant tax rate on ￿rms￿revenue. The monopoly pro￿ts of a foreign ￿rm
are de￿ned similarly with ￿￿ as the tax rate on its revenue.
Let us de￿ne the ￿natural rates of output￿(Woodford, 2003) at date t, Y n
H;t and Y n
F;t, as
the levels of home and foreign output which would prevail in the ￿ exible-price equilibrium.




























; i 2 NF;
where we have used equations (12) and ￿ and ￿￿ are the measures of distortion due to
market power de￿ned by
1 ￿ ￿ =
￿ ￿ 1
￿




5See Woodford (2003, Section 3.1) for how to make this assumption consistent with the supposition that
each producer uses a di⁄erent type of labor.
9When ￿ and ￿￿ are set so that ￿ = ￿￿ = 0, the ￿ exible-price equilibrium is e¢ cient.




t(i) = YF;t=nF for all i 2 NF. Thus, the natural rates of output, Y n
H;t
and Y n














= 1 ￿ ￿￿: (13)
3.3 New Keynesian aggregate supply relations
Now suppose that goods prices are adjusted at random intervals as in Calvo (1983). Let
￿ be the probability that each good price remains unchanged in each period. We assume
that this probability is identical in the two countries.
Consider the price adjustment in the home country. Suppose that the price of good





































It follows that all producers that change their prices at date t choose the same price.
Log-linearizing equation (14) and the corresponding equation for the foreign country
lead to the ￿New Keynesian￿aggregate-supply relations:
￿H;t = ￿HxH;t + ￿HFnFxF;t + ￿Et￿H;t+1; (15)
￿￿
F;t = ￿HFnHxH;t + ￿FxF;t + ￿Et￿￿
F;t+1: (16)
Here ￿H;t ￿ lnPH;t ￿ lnPH;t￿1 and ￿￿
F;t ￿ lnP￿
F;t ￿ lnP￿
F;t￿1 are the in￿ ation rates for
goods produced in the home and foreign countries, respectively; xj;t ￿ lnYj;t￿lnY n
j;t is the
￿output gap￿in country j = H;F; and the coe¢ cients are given by
￿H ￿ ￿
￿
1 + ! + (￿ ￿ 1)nH
￿
> 0;
￿HF ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1);
￿F ￿ ￿
￿










When the two countries coordinate their policies, our welfare criterion for evaluating these

























Speci￿cally, we shall work with a quadratic loss function derived from a second-order ap-
proximation of (18) following Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), among
others.
Consider a non-stochastic steady state with zero in￿ ation, and assume for simplicity
that ￿ = ￿￿ = 0. Then, as shown in the Appendix, a second-order approximation of the






where ￿0 and ￿1 are constants independent of policy, and Lt is a quadratic measure of the





























where ￿ is the period in which policies are evaluated.
Our welfare measure clearly shows that what must be stabilized are the DPI in￿ ation
rates, ￿H;t and ￿￿
F;t, rather than the CPI in￿ ation rates, ￿t and ￿￿




t￿1. An equivalent result is shown by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2001) as well as by Benigno and Benigno (2003), in di⁄erent contexts.
113.5 Real interest rates in open economies
In an economy where a single good is produced and consumed, it is straightforward to de￿ne
the real interest rate. If di⁄erent commodities are produced and consumed, it becomes less
obvious how to de￿ne the real interest rate. In the standard closed-economy New Keynesian
model, a variety of di⁄erentiated commodities are produced and consumed, but there is still
no ambiguity in the de￿nition of the real interest rate, because every household consumes
the same basket of goods, which also coincides with the basket of goods produced in the
economy. There the CPI-based real interest rate coincides with the DPI-based real interest
rate.
Since the real interest rate is clearly de￿ned in the closed economy, so is the ￿natural rate
of interest￿ : it is de￿ned as the real interest rate in the ￿ exible-price equilibrium. With
sticky prices, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the in￿ ation rate is completely eliminated
if the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate, and the natural rate of interest are
all equalized. As discussed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), however, if the natural
interest rate becomes negative, the zero lower bound condition for the nominal interest rate
binds in the optimal policy problem, and it is no longer possible to completely stabilize the
in￿ ation rate.
The corresponding notions in the open economy framework are less clear, however,
even in our speci￿cation where representative individuals in the two countries consume
exactly the same basket of goods in equilibrium and both have access to the complete
set of state-contingent claims at the same prices. The reason is that the two countries
produce di⁄erent baskets of goods. It follows that each country has a distinct DPI-based
real interest rate, which is also di⁄erent from the CPI-based real interest rate. Thus, the
question of which real interest rate should be relevant to the monetary authority is now
non-trivial. Naturally, the answer depends on its chosen objective. Here, the objective of
the monetary authority is to minimize the expected world-welfare loss function (21), and
thus to stabilize the DPI in￿ ation rates, ￿H;t and ￿￿
F;t. It follows that the relevant real
interest rates are the DPI-based rates.




















Given that the DPI in￿ ation rates are the ones to be stabilized, the relevant natural
rates of interest are also DPI-based: these are de￿ned as the DPI-based real interest rates



























Here the natural rates of output, Y n
H;t and Y n
F;t, are de￿ned by the productivity shocks, ￿t
and ￿￿
t, as shown in equations (13). It follows that the natural rates of interest, Rn
H;t and
Rn
F;t, are also completely determined by the exogenous productivity shocks.6




1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nH
￿






1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nF
￿









Following convention, the dynamic IS relations are obtained by log-linearizing the Euler
equations and taking the conditional expectation. Here, since the DPIs are the in￿ ation
rates that the monetary authorities should watch, the relevant Euler equations are (6)-(7),
and hence the corresponding IS relations become:
iH;t = Et
n￿
1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nH
￿
(xH;t+1 ￿ xH;t) (26)






1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nF
￿
(xF;t+1 ￿ xF;t) (27)





6Notice that we could also de￿ne the CPI-based natural rate of interest, which turns out to be unique
and the same across the two countries. However, it is not relevant to the determination of monetary policy
in our model and so is omitted here.
13where iH;t and iF;t are the logs of the gross nominal interest rates. Note that equations (24)
and (25) coincide with equations (26) and (27), respectively, because rH;t = iH;t￿Et￿H;t+1
and rF;t = iF;t￿Et￿￿
F;t+1. The zero bounds for the nominal interest rates are
iH;t ￿ 0; (28)
iF;t ￿ 0: (29)
A competitive equilibrium attains the ￿rst best outcome (up to a ￿rst-order approxi-
mation) if
￿H;t = ￿￿
F;t = xH;t = xF;t = 0;
at all dates and under all contingencies. Given equations (26) and (27), the nominal interest
rates in such an equilibrium are equal to the DPI-based natural rates of interest:
ij;t = rn
j;t; j = H;F:
In this sense, our de￿nition of the natural rates of interest, equations (22) and (23), is
a natural extension of the one used by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for the closed
economy.
The fact that the natural rates of interest relevant to welfare are those based on the DPI
in￿ ation rate as in equations (22)-(23) explains why it is possible for the two countries to fall
separately into liquidity traps even though the international asset market is complete. Here,
representative agents in the two countries trade the complete set of state contingent claims
at the same prices. For any given basket of goods, therefore, both the corresponding real
interest rate and the corresponding natural rate of interest are identical for individuals in
di⁄erent countries. Thus the situation where just one of the countries is caught in a liquidity
trap does not arise because agents in di⁄erent countries face di⁄erent real interest rates;
rather, it arises because the two monetary authorities are watching di⁄erent real interest
rates and hence di⁄erent natural rates of interest. Optimal monetary policy requires the
monetary authority in each country to control the real interest rate based on the DPI;
it does so by choosing a policy interest rate that takes into account the natural rate of
interest de￿ned in terms of that country￿ s DPI, as shown in equations (24)-(25).
144 Optimal Monetary Policy in the face of a Global Liquidity
Trap
4.1 Optimal Monetary Policy in the face of a Global Liquidity Trap
In this section we analyze the equilibrium when policy is optimal and coordinated with the
optimal policy coordination.7 Speci￿cally, suppose that, at some date ￿, the two monetary
authorities coordinate with each other and choose their policies with perfect commitment
in order to achieve an equilibrium that maximizes world welfare. The equilibrium in this
case is obtained by solving the Ramsey problem, that is, by minimizing the world-welfare
loss function (21) subject to the constraints (15), (16), (26), (27), (28), and (29). This
equilibrium is referred to as the Ramsey equilibrium.
Consider ￿rst the case in which the zero bound conditions for the nominal interest rates,
equations (28) and (29), never bind. Then the Ramsey equilibrium can be implemented
7Existing studies on optimal monetary policy in open economies, such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001)
and Benigno and Benigno (2003), investigate the Nash equilibrium along with the cooperative equilibrium.
In this paper, we focus on the latter equilibrium because the examination of the Nash equilibrium gives a
substantially di⁄erent welfare measure.
In the Nash equilibrium, the optimal policy interest rate in the home country is chosen so as to maximize
the utility of representative agents in the home country H given by equation (1). Thus, an optimizer in the
home country no longer considers the welfare of representative agents in the foreign country.
Benigno and Benigno (2003) show that a quadratic measure of welfare includes linear terms for con-
sumption and output. They conclude that the elimination of these linear terms requires the assumption
of perfect price stability through the game theoretic strategies of the two central banks. In the face of a
liquidity trap, however, perfect price stability cannot be attained. The linear term in the welfare measure
makes the optimal monetary policy analysis impossible.
Alternatively, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) propose treating the foreign variables as given constants.















While this quadratic measure of the welfare loss contains only home variables, comparison between the
Nash equilibrium and the cooperative equilibrium involves a new di¢ culty because the sum of the quadratic
measures of welfare loss in the two countries does not coincide with equation (19).









(xF;t ￿ xF;t￿1) = 0: (31)
These rules are inward looking in the sense that the monetary authority in each country
only needs to look at the in￿ ation rate and the output gap in its own country. Thus, as
long as the zero bound conditions for the nominal interest rates do not bind, world welfare
is maximized by a purely inward-looking policy.8 This point has been previously made,
for instance, by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). Note that this inward-looking feature
of the optimal monetary policy does not depend on the value of ￿.
However, the optimal monetary policy can no longer be described by inward-looking
rules if the zero lower bound conditions bind with a positive probability. Even with the
producer currency pricing, foreign variables must be included in the domestic targeting
rule. The degree of in￿ uence from foreign variables is determined by ￿. Denoting the
Lagrange multipliers associated with inequalities (28) and (29) by ￿H;t and ￿F;t, the ￿rst









(xF;t ￿ xF;t￿1) = zF;t; (33)






























Comparing the targeting rules (30)-(31) and (32)-(33), we see that when the zero bound
binds, the e⁄ect is summarized by the term zt = (zH;t;zF;t). Suppose that country j 2
8Our assumption of producer currency pricing is also crucial for this result. As shown by Devereux and
Engel (2003), under local currency pricing, the optimal monetary policy aims at stabilizing the nominal
exchange rate and therefore takes foreign variables into consideration. Investigation of the optimal monetary
policy under local currency pricing is left for our future research.
16fH;Fg is in a liquidity trap in some period ^ t, so that ￿j;^ t > 0. Then it a⁄ects zt for three
periods: t = ^ t;^ t + 1;^ t + 2, as shown by equation (35). If ￿H;t = ￿F;t = 0 for all t, the
optimal targeting rules (32)-(33) reduce to the inward-looking rules (30)-(31).
To understand better the e⁄ect of a liquidity trap on the optimal policy, Figure 2 plots
how zH and zF respond to a one-time increase in ￿H for di⁄erent values of ￿ in equation
(34). Speci￿cally it shows how zH;t and zF;t vary when ￿H;t = 0 for all t 6= 1 and ￿H;1 = 1
with ￿F;t = 0 for all t.9 Let us look at the top panel, which shows how the optimal targeting
rule for the home country is a⁄ected when the home country falls into a liquidity trap in
period 1. In the period that the zero bound binds, the monetary authority has to allow for
de￿ ation and a negative output gap, so that the targeting rule shifts downward: zH;1 < 0.
However, such a downward shift in the targeting rule is alleviated by promising an upward
shift in the targeting rule in the future, zH;2 > 0. In other words, a country caught in a
liquidity trap can reduce the damage it sustains if the monetary authority commits itself
to generating some in￿ ation and positive output gaps in the future. This feature of the
optimal monetary policy is the history dependence that is emphasized in previous studies
on the closed economy, such as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Jung, Teranishi, and
Watanabe (2005).
The possibility of a global liquidity trap adds an additional feature to the optimal
policy: international dependence. Mathematically, such interdependence can be seen by
the fact that the country-speci￿c Lagrange multipliers on the zero bound constraints, ￿H;t
and ￿F;t, each a⁄ect both zH;t and zF;t as shown in equation (34) provided that ￿ 6= 1.10
For instance, if the home country is in a liquidity trap in period t, then ￿H;t > 0; this will
a⁄ect not only the home country￿ s targeting rule (32), but also the foreign country￿ s rule
(33) through its in￿ uence on zH;t and zF;t. The optimal rate of in￿ ation for each country
is a⁄ected by whether or not the other country is caught in a liquidity trap. Economic
e¢ ciency is no longer attained simply by ￿ keeping one￿ s house in order.￿
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows how a liquidity trap in the home country a⁄ects
9The parameter values used to plot the ￿gure are summarized in Table 1, which is discussed in Section
4.2.
10It is clear from equation (34) that if ￿ = 1, then ￿j only a⁄ects zj for each j = H;F. Thus, the targeting
rules (32)-(33) do not exhibit the form of international dependence discussed here. In what follows, whenever
we emphasize the international dependence of the optimal monetary policy, we are implicitly assuming that
￿ 6= 1.
17the optimal targeting rule for the foreign country. The direction of the e⁄ect depends
on whether ￿ is greater or less than unity. This follows from the fact that the source
of the international dependence in our model is the dependence of the marginal utility
from consuming the composite good produced in one country on the consumption of the
composite good produced in the other country. When ￿ > 1, however, home goods and
foreign goods are Edgeworth substitutes, i.e., uHF = uFH < 0. The marginal utility of
the consumption of the composite good produced in one country is a⁄ected in the same
direction by the consumption of the composite good produced in either country, becasue
uHH < 0 and uFF < 0. Thus, in this case, a shift of the optimal targeting rule in one
country is transmitted into a shift of the optimal targeting rule in the other country in the
same direction. This can be seen in the ￿gure that ￿H;t a⁄ects zF;t and zH;t in the same
direction when ￿ = 2. To the contrary, when ￿ < 1, home goods and foreign goods are
Edgeworth complements: uHF = uFH > 0. Thus, the marginal utility of the consumption
of goods produced in each country is a⁄ected in the opposite directions by the consumption
of goods produced in the two countries. As a result, the optimal targeting rule in the two
countries shift in the opposite directions. This is consistent with the ￿gure in the case of
￿ = 0:5.
A further insight into how monetary policy should be conducted in a global liquidity
trap is obtained by looking at the dynamic IS curves (26)-(27) with the zero bound condi-
tions (28)-(29). First, suppose that the natural rate of interest associated with the home
good is negative in period t0, rn
H;t0 < 0, so that the home country is in a liquidity trap:
0 = iH;t0 = rH;t0 + Et0￿H;t0+1;
where rH;t0 denotes the real interest rate associated with the home good as de￿ned in
equation (24).
The optimal policy attempts to relax the degree to which the zero constraint binds.
There are several ways to do this. One way is for the monetary authority in the home
country to commit to future stimulation of the home economy once the natural rate returns
to a positive level. Such a commitment makes Et0￿H;t0+1 > 0 and Et0(xH;t0+1￿xH;t0) > 0.
Both of these would o⁄set at least partially the depressing e⁄ect of the negative shock
to the home natural rate. Additionally, if the foreign monetary authority also commits to
achieve (￿￿1)Et0(xF;t0+1￿xF;t0) > 0, then the zero constraint for the home country would
be relaxed further. Thus, if ￿ > 1 (respectively, if ￿ < 1), a future expansion (contraction)
18of the foreign economy helps alleviate the severity of the current liquidity trap for the home
economy. In this way, policy commitment by each of the two monetary authorities acts to
reduce the welfare loss associated with the home country￿ s liquidity trap.
Next suppose that the natural rate in the home country returns to a positive level in
period t1 > t0. The IS curve for the foreign country is
iF;t1 = rF;t1 + Et1￿￿
F;t1+1;
where rF;t1 denotes the real interest rate associated with the foreign good de￿ned in (25).
Given the home monetary authority￿ s policy commitment, the home economy experiences
a temporary boom in period t1, xH;t1 > 0, which implies that Et1(xH;t1+1 ￿ xH;t1) < 0.
From the perspective of the foreign monetary authority, if ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1) this constitutes
a negative (positive) shock to the real interest rate rF;t1. Thus, for ￿ > 1 (for ￿ < 1),
the foreign monetary authority tends to lower (raise) iF;t when the home natural rate,
rH;t, becomes positive. Notice also that such a response by the foreign monetary authority
tends to raise (lower) xF;t1 when ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1); this is consistent with the foreign monetary
authority￿ s commitment to generate (￿ ￿ 1)Et0(xF;t0+1 ￿ xF;t0) > 0 during periods when
the home country is in the liquidity trap.
4.2 Numerical example
In order to further analyze the properties of the optimal policy, let us consider a numerical
example, which extends the closed-economy experiment of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
to our open-economy environment. The parameters assumed here are summarized in Table
1. Suppose that in the initial period t = 0, the world economy is in the steady state where
the natural rate is rn =
1￿￿
￿ , and the in￿ ation rates and the output gaps are all zero:
￿H = ￿￿
F = xH = xF = 0. Then, in period t = 1, the natural rates of interest in both
countries drop unexpectedly to a negative level rn < 0. These negative natural rate shocks
are temporary, and we assume that the natural rates evolve according to the following
stochastic process: (i) rn
H;1 = rn
F;1 = rn; (ii) if rn






rn; with probability pt;
rn; with probability 1 ￿ pt;
19where pt = p for 1 ￿ t ￿ S ￿ 1 and pt = 1 for t ￿ S; (iii) if rn






rn; with probability qt;
rn; with probability 1 ￿ qt;
where qt = q for 1 ￿ t ￿ S and qt = 1 for t > S; (iv) if rn
j;t = rn, then rn
j;t+1 = rn with
probability one, for j = H;F and for all t > 1. Here, S is a large positive integer that
determines the maximal number of periods for which a country￿ s natural rate may remain
negative.
Let TH and TF be the stopping times de￿ned respectively as the last periods in which
rn
H;t = rn and rn
F;t = rn. The probability that (TH;TF) = (￿H;￿F) is (1 ￿ p)￿H￿1p(1 ￿
q)￿F￿1q for each (￿H;t;￿F;t) 2 f1;:::;Sg2. For a given monetary policy, the equilibrium is
described by a set of stochastic processes fiH;t;iF;t;￿H;t;￿￿
F;t;xH;t;xF;tg1
t=1, each of which is
adapted to the ￿ltration generated by the stopping times (TH;TF). The optimal monetary
policy chooses this set of stochastic processes so as to solve the Ramsey problem described in
the previous subsection. The details of the numerical algorithm are given in the Appendix.
In what follows, we examine equilibrium paths under the optimal policy associated with
particular realizations of the stopping times (TH;TF).
Let us begin with the symmetric case: TH = TF, that is, the case in which the natural
rates of both economies return to the normal level r in the same period. Figure 3 plots
the paths of the nominal interest rates iH;t and iF;t, the in￿ ation rates ￿H;t and ￿￿
F;t, and
the output gaps xH;t and xF;t for the case of TH = TF = 15 (that is, both rn
H;t and rn
F;t
become positive again when t = 16). It is clear that the optimal policy exhibits the kind
of history dependence discussed in the previous subsection. The nominal interest rate in
each country remains set to zero for two more periods (t = 16;17) after its natural rate
becomes positive. Correspondingly, the in￿ ation rate and the output gap in each country
become positive in period 16. As discussed in the previous subsection, such a commitment
alleviates the contractionary e⁄ects from negative natural rates r in earlier periods. With
the symmetric realization of the shocks, however, it is di¢ cult to tell the extent to which
the optimal policy shows international dependence. It is more easily seen for cases when
the realizations of the shocks are asymmetric.
Figure 4 depicts the case where TH = 15 and TF = 10 (that is, where rn
H;t and rn
F;t
return to r when t = 16 and t = 11, respectively). Again, the history dependence is
evident: the nominal interest rate in each country remains set to zero for a while even
20after its natural rate returns to normal; and in each economy both in￿ ation rate and
output gap are positive in the period its natural rate shifts from rn to rn. Furthermore,
the international dependence of the optimal policy can also be clearly seen. For instance,
look at what happens to the foreign country￿ s nominal interest rate iF;t after the home
country￿ s natural rate returns to rn (i.e., t = 16;17). The home country￿ s output gap
increases temporarily in period 16, as a result of which its expected growth rate from t to
t + 1 is negative for t = 16;17. Given that our example has ￿ = 2, the negative growth
of the home output gap works as a negative shock on the real interest rate rn
F;t de￿ned in
equation (25). This is why the foreign nominal interest rate iF;t declines for the periods
t = 16;17. Analogously, the negative expected growth rate implied by the foreign output
gap in the period when the foreign natural rate returns to rn (t = 11) acts as a negative
shock on the real interest rate rH;t de￿ned in equation (24). In that period, however,
the home country is still caught in a liquidity trap and the home nominal interest rate
cannot be lowered further. Instead, the e⁄ect of this negative shock on rH;t is mostly seen
in the shape of a decline in the home output gap in period 11. Yet another form of the
international dependence appears in the term Et(xF;t+1￿xF;t) in equation (24) for periods
t ￿ TH. When rn
F;t returns to rn in period 11, the foreign output gap rises at ￿rst, and then
declines for a few periods (t = 12;13 in Figure 3). After this, the foreign output gap starts
to increase gradually (for t = 14;15;16 in the ￿gure). Although quantitatively small, this
behavior of the foreign output gap for t = 14;15;16 is enough to yield Et(xF;t+1￿xF;t) > 0
during those periods, which helps to alleviate the severity of the liquidity trap that the
home country is caught in.
Variation in the Ramsey equilibrium path across di⁄erent realizations of the shocks is
illustrated in Figure 5. There, the paths of the nominal interest rates under the optimal
policy are plotted for the cases where TF = 10 but TH varies from 12 to 17. These paths
are interpreted in the same way as in the previous ￿gure: The optimal policy is seen to be
characterized primarily by international dependence and history dependence.
The next two ￿gures demonstrate how the Ramsey equilibrium depends on the prob-
abilities of the natural rates returning to normal, p and q. In Figure 6, we continue to
assume that p = q as in the previous ￿gures, but allow the value to vary. Speci￿cally,
we plot the paths of the nominal interest rates under the optimal policy when TH = 15
and TF = 10 and it is assumed that p = q 2 f0:15;0:2;0:25;0:3g. It can be seen that, as
21probabilities p and q get smaller, the history dependence e⁄ect becomes more marked: that
is, the optimal monetary policy requires commitment to a lower interest rate for longer
periods. The international dependence e⁄ect is also magni￿ed by a smaller value of p and
q (notice the larger drop in iF;t after t = 16). This is because a larger degree of history
dependence ampli￿es the boom in a country when its natural rate returns to normal, and
this in turn increases the impact on the real interest rate in the other country.
In Figure 7, we consider the case of asymmetric probabilities: p 6= q. We ￿x q = 0:25
and let p vary from 0.2 to 0.275. To focus on the asymmetry of the probabilities, we look
at the equilibrium path for a symmetric realization of the shocks, TH = TF = 10. The
￿gure demonstrates that a lower value of p leads to a larger degree of history dependence
in the home monetary policy and also a larger degree of international dependence from the
perspective of the foreign monetary policy.
5 Simple Monetary-Policy Rules
In this section we examine the extent to which the optimal monetary policy can be approx-
imated by a ￿simple￿interest-rate rule. In the case of a closed economy with no possibility
of falling into a liquidity trap, Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) show that the optimal
policy is replicated fairly well by the class of interest-rate rules that respond only to the
in￿ ation rate. In the liquidity trap case, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that a
simple price-level targeting policy performs well for the closed economy. Our question is
whether a similarly simple such monetary policy rule can be identi￿ed for our model of a
global liquidity trap. For this purpose, we restrict attention to classes of simple interest-
rate rules where nominal interest rates respond to some combination of in￿ ation rates, price
levels, output gaps, and nominal exchange rates. We will see that a simple interest-rate
rule that includes both the foreign price level and the output gap in addition to those of
the home country can improve welfare. Among the various rules we consider, this is the
one that best captures the key features of the optimal monetary policy analyzed in the
previous section.
We start with the case where the nominal interest rate in each country is set to respond
only to domestic variables. Speci￿cally, consider the following two classes of interest rate
22rule: the interest rate rule with in￿ ation targets:
~ {H;t = ￿￿ (￿H;t ￿ ￿H;t) + ￿xxH;t + r;






+ ￿xxF;t + r;
(36)
and the interest rate rule with price-level targets:




+ ￿xxH;t + r;







+ ￿xxF;t + r:
(37)
In what follows we assume that the target in￿ ation rates in the interest-rate rules (36) are
zero: ￿H;t = ￿￿
F;t = 0; and that the target price levels in the interest-rate rules (37) are
the date-0 price levels: PH;t = PH;0 and P
￿
F;t = P￿
F;0. Due to the zero bound on nominal
interest rates, the actual rates set by the monetary authorities are
iH;t = maxf~ {H;t;0g; and iF;t = maxf~ {F;t;0g:
Given that the natural rates, rn
H;t and rn
F;t, follow the stochastic process described in
the previous section, we compare the expected world-welfare loss (21) evaluated in period
1 under alternative policy rules. For the interest-rate rules (36)-(37), we restrict the policy
parameters so that 1:1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 5, 0 ￿ ￿x ￿ 5, and 1:1 ￿ ￿p ￿ 5.11 Furthermore,
this parameter space is discretized with a grid size of 0.5, when searching for the optimal
parameter con￿guration.
Table 2 shows the optimal con￿guration of parameters for each class of interest-rate
rules and the associated world-welfare losses (21). They are normalized by the world-
welfare loss for the optimal monetary policy. In the table, the label ￿ITR￿denotes the
interest-rate rule with in￿ ation targets and ￿PLTR￿ denotes the interest-rate rule with
price-level targets.
The second row of Table 2 shows that the best in￿ ation-targeting rule puts a zero
weight on the output gap. This is similar to what Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007) ￿nd in
a closed-economy model without a liquidity trap. The fourth row indicates that a price-
level targeting rule ought also to place some weight on the output gap. For comparison, the
￿rst and third rows of Table 2 provide the world-welfare losses under some conventional
parameter con￿gurations: speci￿cally, ￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿x = 0:5 for the interest-rate rule
11This restriction acts to guarantee determinacy.
23with in￿ ation targets, and ￿p = 1:5 and ￿x = 0:5 for the interest-rate rule with price-level
targets.
In terms of welfare, the interest-rate rule with price-level targets performs far better
than the in￿ ation-targeting rule, as is shown in the fourth row of Table 2. The reason is
that the in￿ ation-targeting rule does not provide any history dependence, a key element in
mitigating the severity of a liquidity trap. In contrast, with price-level targets, the nominal
interest rate in each country is gradually adjusted to its steady-state level after the natural
rate regains its steady-state value. This enables it to generate history dependence. This
property of the policy with price-level targets is in line with the ￿ndings of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) for the closed economy model with a liquidity trap.
Now let us look at the case where the home country adopts an interest-rate rule with
in￿ ation targets but the foreign country adopts an interest-rate rule with price-level tar-
gets.12 The ￿fth row of Table 2 shows the substantial deterioration in world welfare in this
case compared to when both countries adopt an interest-rate rule with price-level targets.
The clear implication is that the two monetary authorities should jointly commit to an
interest-rate rule with price-level targets when faced with a global liquidity trap. A single
country￿ s commitment to a history dependent policy is not enough.
We next examine if including foreign variables in the domestic policy rule improves
welfare. For this purpose, we augment the interest-rate rule with price-level targets with
foreign variables as follows:











+ ￿xxH;t + ￿xaxF;t + r;











+ ￿xxF;t + ￿xaxH;t + r;
(38)
where we restrict the policy parameters so that 0 ￿ ￿xa ￿ 5 and 0 ￿ ￿pa ￿ 5. Following
these rules, a country lowers its policy rate when the other country experiences a downturn,
i.e., a negative output gap and a price level lower than the target level. Thus, these rules
capture international dependence. The sixth row of Table 2 shows how augmenting the
policy rule in this way improves welfare.
We can interpret the augmented rules (38) in terms of the nominal exchange rate. Note
that it follows from the household￿ s ￿rst-order conditions (10) that the nominal exchange
12This may be viewed as a situation where one country commits to its policy but in the other policy



























and let ￿t denote the exchange rate gap, i.e., ￿t ￿ lnEt ￿ lnEn












+ xH;t ￿ xF;t:
































+ (￿x ￿ ￿ex)xF;t + (￿xa + ￿ex)xH;t ￿ ￿ex￿t + r;
where ￿ex is a positive parameter. Thus, the welfare gain from augmenting the rule can be
interpreted as the bene￿t of letting the policy rate respond to the nominal exchange rate.
This helps the policy rule to capture the features of desirable policy in a global liquidity
trap, namely, history dependence and international dependence.13
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we consider a two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model, and
analyze the optimal monetary policy when monetary authorities cooperate in the face of a
global liquidity trap ￿ that is, a situation where both countries are caught simultaneously
in liquidity traps. Compared to the closed economy case, the most notable feature of the
optimal policy in the global liquidity trap is its international dependence. Whether or not
a country￿ s nominal interest rate is hitting the zero bound a⁄ects the target in￿ ation rate
in the other country. The direction of the e⁄ect depends on whether goods produced in the
13The the exchange rate peg to another country￿ s currency for escaping from a liquidity trap, so called
foolproof way in Svensson (2001), can not work well in a global liquidity trap. After one country is out of
a liquidity trap, foolproof way could work as shown in Coenen and Wieland (2003).
25two countries are Edgeworth complements or substitutes. We also compare several classes
of simple interest-rate rules. Our ￿nding is that targeting the price level yields higher
welfare than targeting the in￿ ation rate, and that it is desirable to let the policy rate of
each country respond not only to its own price level and output gap, but also to those in
the other country.
The model considered in this paper is of course very stylized, and the robustness of our
￿ndings needs to be tested under alternative assumptions. For instance, our current analy-
sis is restricted to the case where the monetary authorities in the two countries coordinate
their monetary policy choices with each other so as to maximize world welfare. In real,
the monetary policy coordination is not easy. An alternative assumption would be that
the monetary authorities set their respective policies in a non-cooperative way. Another
extension of potential interest would be to consider how the results would be a⁄ected if we
adopted local currency pricing, rather than producer currency pricing as at present. Also,
it would be of interest to introduce debt-de￿ ation mechanism during recessions. In this
case, we suppose that the zero interest rate policy could be longer than otherwise due to a
larger impact of de￿ ation on the economy. These extensions are left for future research.
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28Table 1: Parameter values
Parameters Values Explanation
￿ 0.99 Subjective discount factor
￿ 2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
￿ 0.024 Elasticity of in￿ ation with respect to output
￿ 0.66 Probability of price change
￿ 1 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
￿ 7.88 Elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated goods
! 0.47 Frish elasticity
nH 0.5 Country size
￿, ￿￿ 0 Steady-state distortions
rn -0.02/4 Negative natural rate shock
S 50 Maximal length of periods with rn
t = rn
29Table 2: Relative losses under di⁄erent rules
Rule Parameters Relative loss
Conventional ITR ￿￿ = 1:5, ￿x = 0:5 232.8
Best rule in ITR ￿￿ = 5, ￿x = 0 218.01
Conventional PLTR ￿p = 1:5, ￿x = 0:5 5.76
Best rule in PLTR ￿p = 5, ￿x = 0:5 2.93
Best rule in PLTR in the home country ￿p = 5, ￿x = 5 91.78
and best rule in ITR in the foreign country and ￿￿ = 1:1, ￿x = 5
Best rule in PLTR with foreign output gap ￿p = 5, ￿x = 0:5, ￿xa = 0:5 2.69
and foreign prive level and ￿pa = 5
Note: The relative loss is given by dividing each loss by one under the optimal monetary policy.
ITR denotes the interest-rate rule with in￿ ation targets. PLTR denotes the interest-rate rule with
price-level targets.
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Figure 1: Policy interest rates in several advanced countries.
Note: Shadow indicates the range of the target rate plus/minus intraday one standard deviation
for the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, and the range of high-low euro deposit rates for the
Bank of England and the European Central Bank. Sources: Bloomberg; Bank of Japan; Federal
Reserve; Bank of England; European Central Bank.

























Figure 2: Response of zH and zF to a one-time increase in ￿H for di⁄erent values
of ￿. The upper panel shows the dynamics of zH and the lower panel shows the
dynamics of zF.





















Figure 3: Case for TH = TF = 15.




















Figure 4: Case for TF = 10 and TH = 15.






























































Figure 5: Case for from TH = 12 to TH = 17 and TF = 10.


























Figure 6: Case for TF = 10 and TH = 15 with di⁄erent p = q.


















iH under p=0.2 and q=0.25
iH under p=0.225 and q=0.25
iH under p=q=0.25
iH under p=0.275 and q=0.25
iF under p=0.2 and q=0.25
iF under p=0.225 and q=0.25
iF under p=q=0.25
iF under p=0.275 and q=0.25
Figure 7: Case for TH = TF = 10 with di⁄erent probability p and q.
37Appendix
A Welfare approximation
Here we follow Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) to derive an approxi-
mate world welfare criterion. We assume that the monetary authorities in the two countries
cooperate to maximize aggregate utility.
Given that preferences of the home and foreign household are given by equations (1)









































; j = H;F:













































































38Now, ￿x a non-stochastic steady state with zero in￿ ation. In what follows, a bar over
a variable denotes its steady state value, and a hat indicates the log-deviation from the
steady-state value. Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), we take a second-order ap-





where ’ are parameters of policy rules normalized in such a way that ’ = 0 implies long-run
output levels Yj;1 = ￿ Yj, j = H;F, and for any small enough ’, lnYj;1 ￿ ln ￿ Yj = O(k’k),
















￿ uH ￿ YH
nH
￿

























+ t.i.p. + O(k￿k3);


























F;t + t.i.p. + O(k￿k3): (42)
For simplicity, we follow Woodford (2003) and assume that ￿ and ￿￿ are small to
delete the linear terms in equation (40), nH￿^ YH;t + nF￿￿^ YF;t. Let Y e
j , j = H;F, denote















j ￿ lnY e
j ￿ln ￿ Yj;, j = H;F, denote the e¢ cient levels of the output gaps, where
￿ Yj, j = H;F, are the steady-state levels of output. When ￿ and ￿￿ are small,
￿
1 + ! + (￿ ￿ 1)nH
￿
xe
H + (￿ ￿ 1)nFxe




1 + ! + (￿ ￿ 1)nF
￿
xe
F = ￿￿ + O(k￿￿k2):
Then, using equations (40)-(42), a second-order approximation of the world welfare
measure equation (39) is given by
nHU0 + nFU￿
0 = ￿






￿tLt + t.i.p. + O(k￿;￿￿;￿k3);
















B Numerical Algorithm for Stochastic Simulation
Suppose that the natural rates of the two countries follows the stochastic process as de-
scribed in the main text, and consider the Ramsey problem in period ￿ = 1 of mini-
mizing the world welfare function (21) subject to the constraints (15), (16), (26), (27),
(28), and (29). Let  t ￿ ( H;t; F;t) be the multipliers for constraints (15) and (16), and
￿t ￿ (￿H;t;￿F;t) be the multiplier associated with constraints (26), (27), (28), and (29).






























nH[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nH](xH;t ￿ xH;t+1)





(￿ ￿ 1)nHnF(xH;t ￿ xH;t+1)





where ￿ is de￿ned in equation (20). The ￿rst-order conditions are given by
￿xt ￿ ￿￿ t + A(￿t ￿ ￿￿1￿t￿1) = 0; (43)
￿t +  t ￿  t￿1 ￿ ￿￿1￿t￿1 = 0; (44)
￿t = ￿N￿1￿xt + ￿Et￿t+1; (45)
it = Et
h





it ￿ 0; ￿t ￿ 0; ￿H;tiH;t = ￿F;t = iF;t = 0; (47)
40where xt = (xH;t;xF;t), ￿t = (￿H;t;￿￿






4nH(1 + (￿ ￿ 1)nH) (￿ ￿ 1)nHnF









Depending on the signs of rn
H;t and rn
F;t, and also depending on whether or not the
zero bound condition binds for iH;t and iF;t, we distinguish nine phases in the equilibrium
dynamics:14
rn
F < 0, iF = 0 rn
F > 0, iF = 0 rn
F > 0, iF > 0
rn
H < 0, iH = 0 phase (1,1) phase (1,2) phase (1,3)
rn
H > 0, iH = 0 phase (2,1) phase (2,2) phase (2,3)
rn
H > 0, iH > 0 phase (3,1) phase (3,2) phase (3,3)
Remember that (TH;TF) 2 f1;:::;Sg2 are the stopping times describing the last peri-
ods in which rn
H;t < 0 and rn
F;t < 0, respectively. Let k1;2(TF) and k2;1(TH) be the numbers
of periods in which phases (1,2) and (2,1) occur given realized values of TF and TH, re-
spectively. Similarly, let k2;2(TH;TF), k2;3(TH;TF), and k3;2(TH;TF) denote the number
of periods in which phases (2,2), (2,3), and (3,2) occur given realized values of TH and
TF, respectively. Here, k1;2(TF), k2;1(TH), k2;2(TH;TF), k2;3(TH;TF), and k3;2(TH;TF)
are all non-negative integers. Our numerical algorithm is to ￿nd a collection of functions
fk1;2(TF); k2;1(TH); k2;2(TH;TF); k2;3(TH;TF); k3;2(TH;TF)g and f￿t(TH;TF); xt(TH;TF);
 t(TH;TF); ￿t(TH;TF); it(TH;TF)g such that the conditions for the Ramsey equilibrium,
(43)-(47) are all satis￿ed.
14In principle, it is possible to have other phases, for instance, the one where r
n
H < 0 and iH > 0. With
our parameter con￿guration, however, we have con￿rmed in our numerical solution that these nine phases
are the only possible ones that occur in the Ramsey equilibrium.
41C Simulation under Deterministic Shock
For simulations under deterministic shocks, following Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe
(2005), we assume that both private-agents and monetary authorities completely fore-







at period t = 1, where S + 1 is
the time when economy is in the steady state.
Figure A1 displays the time paths of nominal interest rates iH;t and iF;t, in￿ ation rates
￿H;t and ￿￿
F;t, and output gaps xH;t and xF;t in the two countries from the top when adverse
shocks in the two countries last until TH = TF = 10. Figure A2 displays the time paths
of nominal interest rates, in￿ ation rates, and output gaps in the two countries when a
shock to natural rate of interest lasts longer in the domestic than in the foreign country at
TH = 15 and TF = 10. We can see that the case with deterministic shocks are similar to
the case with stochastic shocks.























Figure A1: Case for TH = TF = 15 under sthe deterministic shock.























Figure A2: Case for TF = 10 and TH = 15 under the deterministic shock.
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